

The Greek *Poleis*: Demes, Cities and Leagues

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Our series of papers is linked by the definition given in book III of Aristotle's *Politics*. – 'The *polis* is a kind of community (*koinonia*); it is a community of *politai* in a *politeia*'¹ – and I have been asked to write about the *polis* as an independent unit and as a member of a hegemony or a part of a federal state. I have extended my brief somewhat, to include smaller units within the *polis* as well as *poleis* within a larger unit.

The theme which I explore happens to be highly topical, more so than could have been realised when the planning for this meeting was begun in the early summer of 1989 (and the Danish referendum of 1992 made it more appropriate than ever that this theme should have been discussed in Denmark in 1992). What is a state? What kind of unit should be the sovereign body, and what kinds of power should be enjoyed by smaller units within the sovereign body or by larger units in which the sovereign body is included? What should the relationship be between what was Yugoslavia and its constituent parts, or what used to be called the Soviet Union and its constituent parts, or the United Kingdom and its constituent parts? Has Europe a 'federal destiny', and if so what does this mean for the European Community and for the separate states which have joined in that Community?

It is a notorious fact that classical Greece was bedevilled by tension between impulses to unity and impulses to separation. The world of the Greeks, the mainlands surrounding the Aegean and the islands of the Aegean, is divided geographically into a large number of small habitable areas, communication between which is not particularly easy, so that natural units tend to be small units, as they do not (for instance) in much of Italy. It is not clear that bronze-age Greece was based on small independent units, but there were small units in the Greece which emerged from the dark age into the archaic period, and a strong attachment to one's local unit was something which persisted into the classical period and beyond.

Many of the earliest units, however, were too small to survive as totally independent units when life became more settled, more inter-dependent and more prosperous, and one's nearest neighbours did not have to be regarded as enemies. From an early date we find various kinds of combination, which tend to be lumped together under the single label *synoikismos*. Boeotia was a large plain, by Greek standards, containing a number of settlements around a central lake. Already by the end of the dark age some small settlements had coalesced to form larger units, either concentrated on an urban centre or remaining a loose union of separate villages.² It has been claimed that we see this process going wrong in Hesiod's township of Ascra: Thespieae, the nearest larger town, tried to absorb Ascra against the will of the people; Ascra was defeated and its territory taken over by Thespieae, but the people fled to Orchomenus and were received into that community. However, Snodgrass has remarked that the destruction of a *kome* by a *polis* in this way would be strange, and suggests that the allusion is to the suppression of an attempt by Ascra to secede between 386 and 364.³ At any rate, the organisation of the federal state of Boeotia (at which we shall look later) reflects traces of the coalescence of the Boeotian communities into a limited number of *poleis*. Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae and other communities were in a state of *sympoliteia* with Plataea before the Peloponnesian War, but in the early years of the war their inhabitants migrated to Thebes and at the beginning of the fourth century they could be described as *συντελούντων* to Thebes;⁴ Hyettus remained a separate community with a separate name, but was to some extent subordinate to Orchomenus; and Eutresis and Thisbae were likewise subordinate to Thespieae.⁵

Similarly in Arcadia five villages united to form the *polis* of Mantinea, probably about 470;⁶ after the Peace of Antalcidas Sparta insisted on splitting up Mantinea into its component villages once more;⁷ but after Sparta had been weakened by its defeat at Leuctra the single *polis* was reformed,⁸ and it then went on to join in the foundation of a federal state of Arcadia.

Different patterns are displayed by the development of what became the two largest *poleis* of Greece, Athens and Sparta. Athens achieved a political but not a physical *synoikismos*: the people lived in their many separate settlements dispersed throughout Attica, but all men of native Attic stock were *politai* of the *polis* of Athens.⁹ One of the achievements of Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century (possibly, indeed, the achievement which made his complicated reorganisation popular¹⁰) was to give political machinery and a political identity of a subordinate kind to the

individual settlements, the demes whose inhabitants became their *demotai*, and to the intermediate units, the *trittyes* and the tribes, through which the demes were incorporated into the *polis*. There were limits beyond which this process of incorporation did not go. Eleusis was a comparatively late accession to the Athenian state, but not too late to be included.¹¹ On the other hand, the island of Salamis was probably acquired by Athens in the first half of the sixth century,¹² but at the end of the century Athenian cleruchs were sent there, and Salamis was not included in Cleisthenes' organisation but was ruled as subject territory.¹³ Eleutheræ, in the far north-west of Attica, was probably acquired under the tyranny,¹⁴ but it too became subject territory;¹⁵ and so did Oropus at such times as it belonged to Athens.

In the development of Sparta we can trace several different stages. First comes the political but not physical amalgamation of the original four villages, probably into two pairs as the origin of the two royal families, and then into the single unit of Sparta; next the incorporation of Amyclæ.¹⁶ In the organisation attributed to Lycurgus the division of the Spartan citizens into the three Dorian tribes was crossed with a division into obes,¹⁷ and I am among those who believe that there were five obes based on the five villages.¹⁸ We do not know for the archaic and classical periods whether the obes functioned simply as a means of articulation within the citizen body as a whole, for instance by serving as a basis for units in the army, or whether they also functioned as local units with local powers like the demes of Attica, so that a matter concerning Amyclæ alone might be decided by the obesmen of Amyclæ alone; but the development by which individual citizens came to have land throughout Laconia and Messenia, and the nature of the citizens' life in classical Sparta, both suggest that attachment to the locality of their particular obe came not to count for much with Spartan citizens.¹⁹

What we do know is that the Spartans did not go on from the five villages to incorporate the rest of Laconia in the Spartan *polis* in the way in which Attica was incorporated in the Athenian *polis*. The inhabitants of other towns in Laconia became *perioikoi*, and the essential feature of their status seems to have been that they had local autonomy, to run the affairs of their own townships in their own way, but they had no foreign relations of their own but were obliged to follow the lead of the Spartans:²⁰ perioecic towns can be called *poleis* by classical writers,²¹ and the *perioikoi* were *Lakedaimonioi*, who fought alongside Spartan citizens in what can be called the army of the *Lakedaimonioi*²² or even (to contrast it with the forces of Sparta's allies) τὸ πολιτικὸν στρατεύμα.²³ Logically if

not chronologically after the *perioikoi* comes the subjection of those inhabitants of Laconia who became helots, serfs belonging in one sense to the whole Spartan *polis* but in another to individual Spartan citizens whose land they worked, and then the extension of that status to the inhabitants of Messenia when that was conquered in the late eighth and seventh centuries.²⁴

So already by the late archaic period different answers had begun to emerge to the questions – which of course had not yet been consciously formulated – what it meant to be a *polis*, what it meant to be a *polites*, and how small units and their members could be combined in larger units. The larger unit might be the only reality, with the smaller units politically if not physically obliterated, as happened at Mantinea; or it might be the only unit with any independent functions, while the smaller units survived physically and as components of the larger, but with no powers of their own, as with the obes of Sparta. Lesser settlements around a major one might be fully incorporated in a *polis* in such a way that everybody belonged to his own local community and to the *polis* as well, as in Attica after Cleisthenes everybody belonged to his own deme and to the *polis* of Athens, and decisions affecting a particular deme were taken by the members of that deme but decisions affecting the whole *polis* were taken by the whole *polis*. Alternatively the major city might become not merely the seat of administration for the *polis* but the dominant part of the polis, as in Laconia, where the *perioikoi* could take decisions for their own townships, which were in a sense *poleis*, but they were not *politai* of the dominant *polis* of Sparta, and had no say in the decisions of that *polis* yet were required to obey decisions taken by the *politai*. (And the helots remind us that, although I have used the word ‘everybody’, not every inhabitant of a political unit in the Greek world, or even every free inhabitant, was a member of that unit with political rights – but that is not the particular concern of my paper and I shall not labour the point.)

Aristotle was to argue in book VII of the *Politics* that there should be lower and upper limits to the size of the *polis*: lower, because a unit which is too small cannot be self-sufficient, and upper, because that makes it hard for there to be a *politeia*. A large number cannot be orderly, no *strategos* can command them, no man can address them in the assembly, appointments cannot be made and lawsuits cannot be decided when the citizens do not know one another; and if the territory is too large it cannot all be seen from the city.²⁵ Most Greek *poleis*, in population and in territory, did not exceed Aristotle’s limits. Attica and Laconia did. Athens had up to 60,000 adult male citizens in the mid fifth century and prob-

ably 30,000 in the time of Aristotle,²⁶ and for those living farthest away the journey to the city centre was thirty miles / fifty kilometres or more. That pushed to the extreme and beyond the ideal of a *polis* in which every *polites* was a member of a single *koinonia*, knowing and known to all the other *politai*, and equally able with them to take his turn at ruling and being ruled. Sparta, with a theoretical 9,000 citizens and a probable 8,000 in the early fifth century,²⁷ was in its heyday one of the largest in terms of citizen population, but as it continued to expand its territory until it controlled more than three times the area of Attica it had not continued to expand its citizen body. Far from having to face the problem of making polis institutions work for an exceptionally large citizen body, Sparta gave its already large citizen body a way of life which both enabled and required each citizen to spend an exceptionally large proportion of his time in the company of his fellow citizens.

The tension with which I began, between impulses to unity and impulses to separation, continued throughout Greek history, as the large and strong units tried to control or absorb the small and weak, and the small and weak tried to preserve their independence. The archaic Spartan kind of expansion, by direct conquest and subjection of the conquered population to the conquering *polis*, failed for Sparta in the sixth century and was not attempted on a large scale by any other *polis*. Herodotus tells us how Sparta, after conquering Messenia, tried in the sixth century to conquer Tegea but was unsuccessful; after a change of policy symbolised by the taking to Sparta of what were claimed to be the bones of Orestes, Sparta overcame most of the Peloponnese²⁸ – but in such a way that the *poleis* now ‘overcome’ retained their identity as independent *poleis*, and Tegea was later to claim to be the senior ally of Sparta.²⁹ The combining of separate *poleis* in a block of allies was to be the classical Greek way of organising units too large to function as a single *polis*.

Alliances between one *polis* and another had probably been made before the sixth century, for a particular occasion if not for a longer term. The earliest instances that we know of a larger grouping for a long term are religious leagues like the amphictyony of Anthela, which as a result of the First Sacred War at the beginning of the sixth century acquired responsibility for Delphi as well as Anthela. This was an organisation whose members were united for a single purpose only, the administration of particular sanctuaries: they did not to a significant extent give up their sovereignty to a superior or pool it in that of the larger body, but remained independent *poleis*, fully entitled to run their own affairs and go

their own way, and indeed to fight against one another, without detriment to their continuing membership of the amphictyony.

The different strands of Greeks in Asia Minor and its offshore islands had some consciousness of solidarity which could extend beyond a common religious interest. When Aeolian Smyrna was attacked by Ionian Colophon about 700, the other eleven Aeolian cities of the mainland are said to have supported it and to have taken in the fugitives. There is no good evidence for the *Panionion*³⁰ earlier than the sixth century, or for regular meetings there,³¹ but Herodotus does mention meetings of the Ionians there to discuss policy at the time of the Persian conquest and during the Ionian Revolt,³² and in the early sixth century he credits Thales with a proposal that the Ionians should establish a single *bouleuterion* at Teos and that the other cities 'should be inhabited but should be of no more account than if they were demes.'³³ How much truth there is in that we do not know. Clearly among the east Greeks there was some sense that cities of the same stock should cooperate in an emergency, but it was not taken very far. In the Ionian Revolt, though the separate cities sent *probouloi* to the *Panionion*, no command structure was produced, and the appointment of Dionysius of Phocaea was an *ad hoc* measure which did not hold for long.³⁴

Sparta's organisation of the Peloponnesian League was therefore something new. Beginning with Tegea, Sparta made alliances during the sixth century with various Peloponnesian states, and it looks as if these alliances made Sparta the senior partner, whose lead the other state was to some extent bound to follow.³⁵ After Cleomenes' attack on Attica about 506 had been frustrated by the withdrawal of Demaratus and of the Corinthians, the Spartans did a deal with their allies, which resulted in the Peloponnesian League. De Ste Croix has given a detailed but misleading analysis of the League's constitution³⁶ – misleading, because there were no precedents and the Spartans were not skilled constitutional lawyers, and it is overwhelmingly likely that many questions were answered not in advance when the League was organised but *ad hoc* as they arose. The essential features of the League were that the alliance was not for a limited purpose or a limited time but was general and permanent; Sparta had the right of initiative and the executive power; and the allied *poleis* were bound to follow Sparta's lead when a congress of allies agreed to do so but not otherwise. That the members remained fully independent except in foreign policy was probably taken for granted rather than spelled out, but for a long time that independence was not, as far as we know, infringed. One question not formally posed and answered at the

beginning was how the opinions of the individual member *poleis* were to be ascertained and expressed. The *de facto* answer must have been that envoys sent to a League congress expressed an opinion in the light both of what they knew of public opinion at home and of the speeches which they heard there, and if the citizens at home disliked the opinion they expressed they would disown the envoys and refuse to honour the commitment into which the envoys had entered on their behalf.

This is the first instance of a hegemonic league, a league of *poleis* formed primarily for the pursuit of a common foreign policy, in which there is a *hegemon* with executive power but also a mechanism for consulting the other members and limiting the exercise of the executive power. For the *hegemon* this serves as a means of extending the *hegemon's* power over neighbouring *poleis* in a way which they can accept, without openly detracting from their status as independent *poleis*. For the other members it serves as a means of institutionalising the fact of life that more powerful *poleis* tend to dominate less powerful ones, but also of limiting that domination and giving the lesser *poleis* some say in the making of decisions with which they will have to comply.

The alliance formed in 481 to resist the invasion of Xerxes is perhaps better regarded as a separate alliance rather than as an extension of the Peloponnesian League;³⁷ but if we do not make too formal a thing of the Peloponnesian League we shall see that the two bodies were similar in nature, and the distinction between those two views of the alliance is perhaps one which could not have been made at the time. Executive power was vested in Sparta at the first meeting;³⁸ decisions on strategy were made by meetings of *probouloi* before the expeditions to Tempe and to Thermopylae and Artemisium,³⁹ and in more urgent circumstances by councils of generals after Artemisium and before and after Salamis.⁴⁰ The alliance was envisaged as remaining in force after its last campaigns, in 478, so that the Athenians could send troops to Sparta in accordance with it in 462/1 but resign from it subsequently.⁴¹

The Delian League at its inception followed the same pattern once more. The alliance was intended to be permanent, and since it was undoubtedly soon used for purposes other than fighting against Persia we should accept the statement of the *Ath. Pol.* that it was a full offensive and defensive alliance, in which the members swore to have the same friends and the same enemies.⁴² Athens was the *hegemon*, with the executive power. Policy decisions were made by a council of allies, to which the member *poleis*, which were *isopsephoi*,⁴³ sent representatives.⁴⁴ Except as regards foreign policy the allies were independent: despite the references

to *autonomia* in Thucydides,⁴⁵ it is likely that, as in the Peloponnesian League, that was taken for granted rather than spelled out,⁴⁶ and it is an attractive suggestion that the word *autonomia* was coined to refer to the internal independence which the member *poleis* found it increasingly hard to defend against the growing power of Athens.⁴⁷

Athens was to take the power of the *hegemon* much further than Sparta had done. Allies which paid tribute in cash were less well placed to resist Athens than allies which contributed their own forces and could if necessary withdraw them. Athens took a permanent alliance to mean permanent campaigning, which many of the members can hardly have envisaged and for which they could not sustain the enthusiasm; but the League was built up into a very large body of allies, most of them very much smaller and weaker than Athens, and in this state of *polypsephia*⁴⁸ it was easy for the Athenians to induce the council of allies to vote as they wished. By the second half of the fifth century Athens was infringing the *autonomia* of the allies in various ways:⁴⁹ democratic constitutions were imposed, as were governors and garrisons; lawsuits were transferred to Athens; offerings were demanded at Athenian festivals; poor Athenians were settled in cleruchies and rich Athenians were allowed to buy land for themselves in allied territory; *poleis* which provoked Athens and were coerced were treated as defeated enemies. Nothing in Thucydides directly states that the council of allies was abolished, but it is overwhelmingly likely that it was: we certainly find the Athenian assembly making decisions which ought to have been made by the council of allies if it still existed. This was a drastically new attitude to the rights and obligations of *poleis* which had voluntarily entered into an alliance, and it is not surprising that Thucydides writes of enslavement, in his own narrative as well as in speeches,⁵⁰ that it seems to have been admitted even in Athens that Athenian domination was like a tyranny,⁵¹ that Sparta began the Peloponnesian War claiming that it was going to liberate the Greeks.⁵²

Before we leave the fifth century, we must look at another kind of organisation larger than the individual *polis*, the federal state. In 519 Plataea, in the south of Boeotia, when it was under pressure from Thebes, appealed to Sparta and had its appeal redirected to Athens, and the upshot was a ruling from Corinthian mediators that Thebes should leave alone those of the Boeotians who did not want to ἐξ Βοιωτῶν τελέειν.⁵³ Behind that episode lies the fact that Thebes was organising the Boeotian *poleis* into a federal state; we have references to the federal officials called boeotarchs in 480 and 479.⁵⁴ The federation may have broken up after the Persian Wars, and for ten years in the middle of the

century Boeotia was under Athenian domination, but after 446 the federal state was revived, and passages in Thucydides and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* combine to give us the essentials of its structure.⁵⁵ In the individual *poleis* the full citizens, those possessed of a property qualification, were divided into four *boulai*: these took it in turn to act as the probouleutic body, the *boule* in the normal sense of the word, referring matters to the other three for a final decision. The federation was based after 427 on eleven units,⁵⁶ the largest *poleis* with their dependencies accounting for more than one and the smallest being grouped together to form one. All the federal institutions were based on these units: in particular, each unit provided one boeotarch and sixty members of the federal council. The federal council was divided into four *boulai*, which presumably functioned like the four *boulai* of the individual *poleis*.

Thus Boeotia had federal government and *polis* government, and a Boeotian was a citizen of Boeotia and of his *polis*, rather as Athens had *polis* government and deme government, and an Athenian was a citizen of Athens and a demesman of his deme. The difference, presumably, is that the Boeotian *poleis* were not only fewer but also more powerful and independent than the Athenian demes. We do not know in detail how power was divided between the *poleis* and the federation, though the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* states that the federation had common funds and taxes, and had *dikastai*; but it is likely that membership of his own *polis* meant more even to a Boeotian who was active at a federal level than membership of his own deme meant to an Athenian, and membership of the larger body meant correspondingly less, that boeotarchs and members of the federal council were more likely to think of themselves as representing the interests of their *polis*, as it were in an alliance, than Athenian officeholders were to think of themselves as representing the interests of their tribe or deme. It is symptomatic of this that Boeotian *poleis* can from time to time be unwilling to participate in the federation, as *poleis* can be unwilling to participate in a hegemonic league. The subject territory of Oropus sometimes objected to Athenian rule, but we never hear, and we should not expect to hear, of a secessionist movement in an Athenian deme.⁵⁷ It can be added that demes did not have separate relationships with other *poleis*, and did not have military forces which could be regarded as their own.

It is worth emphasising before we move on that both hegemonic leagues and federal states confront – instinctively rather than explicitly – the problem of how to govern a unit too large to satisfy Aristotle's requirements for a *polis*, that it is a community of *politai*, that all the citizens

can meet in an assembly, that all the citizens can know one another, that all the territory can be seen from the city. Their answer to the problem is representative institutions:⁵⁸ a council of allies in a hegemonic league, federal officials and a federal council in a federal state. Individual *poleis*, whether democratic or oligarchic, have direct government, where those eligible to hold office take it in turns to hold office and those eligible to take part in decision-making serve in turns on a council or meet together in an assembly. Fewer citizens have the opportunity to hold office in or serve on the council of their league or federal state, but those who do so are to an unspecified extent representing and speaking for their individual *polis*, and the *politai* of the individual *poleis* can feel that they are part of a larger community.

Sparta won the Peloponnesian War, at the price of surrendering the Greeks of mainland Asia Minor to Persia. The lesson which Sparta seems to have learned from the fifth century is that what Athens had done Sparta might do too. In the early fourth century we find her infringing the independence both of states which she had liberated from Athens and of members of the Peloponnesian League, and further strengthening her own position within her alliance by accepting cash payments in place of personal service from her allies.⁵⁹

We also see Sparta devising in the Common Peace a mechanism which might have become the basis for a more equitable union of *poleis* but which was in fact used first by Sparta and then by others as a means of increasing her own power, not by building up a league of allies but by weakening potential enemies. The principle on which the Common Peace treaties were based was that every *polis*, large or small, should be free and independent,⁶⁰ but that brings us back to the question underlying the whole of my paper, what units are the *poleis* which are entitled to be free and independent, and what should be done with larger and smaller units?

Sparta used the principle as an excuse for breaking up into their component parts hostile units which she wished to weaken. Athens was originally to have no overseas possessions (but eventually was allowed Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, first acquired early in the fifth century);⁶¹ the federal state of Boeotia was to be split into its component *poleis* (but at one stage Sparta considered allowing the federal state to survive on condition that Orchomenus could withdraw from it),⁶² and the *polis* of Mantinea was to be split into the villages from which it had been formed nearly a century before;⁶³ and the recent union of Corinth and Argos (to which we shall return) was undone.⁶⁴ Eventually the principle was to be

used against Sparta, when Messenia was liberated in 370/69 and subsequent treaties included a clause stipulating that Messenia was to remain independent.⁶⁵

Formally the Common Peace was an attempt to resolve the disputes of the Greek *poleis* without organising them in a hegemonic league. Xenophon's version of the Peace of Antalcidas is probably correct: it is a proclamation by the Persians to the Greeks of the terms on which the Corinthian War is to be ended, and a declaration that the Persians, with any Greeks who wish, will make war on any who do not accept the terms.⁶² Beyond that there is no evidence for a mechanism to make the peace work by deciding that a state had broken the terms and requiring action against that state: Sparta was in a dominant position, not because of a special clause in the treaty, but because Sparta had persuaded the Persians to proclaim these terms and Sparta would be able to interpret to the Persians what should count as a breach of the terms.⁶⁷ At any rate in later treaties in the series there were attempts to provide a mechanism.⁶⁸ In the peace before Leuctra there was what has been called a voluntary guarantee clause, by which participants in the peace were allowed to act against, and forbidden to support, a state which broke the peace.⁶⁹ In the peace after Leuctra there was a compulsory guarantee clause, obliging participants to act against a state which broke the peace. On that occasion participants swore to 'the treaty which the King sent down and the decrees of the Athenians and their allies':⁷⁰ it is hardly likely that the Athenians enlarged their Second League to include nearly all the Greeks, and the best explanation of the reference to the decrees of the Athenians and their allies is that the freedom and independence guaranteed to participants were to be interpreted as in the Second League.⁷¹ Compulsory action against any state refusing to comply was envisaged in the peace which the Thebans tried to obtain in 367,⁷² and Thebes wanted but Corinth refused to combine an alliance with the limited peace of 365;⁷³ after Mantinea the Greeks made a common peace and alliance.⁷⁴ Like the Peace of Antalcidas, however, these later treaties lacked not only a *hegemon* but any mechanism for ruling that the peace had been broken and that action was needed.

Athens seemed to have learned that with the Delian League she had gone much further than was acceptable in infringing the independence of the member *poleis*, and at the foundation of her Second League she promised that those infringements would not be repeated: this time the *poleis* were to be free and autonomous, governed under whatever constitution they wished, not subjected to a garrison or governor or required

to pay tribute, and there was to be no Athenian property in the territory of the member *poleis*.⁷⁵ There was a council of allies, independent of Athens to the extent of having a non-Athenian chairman,⁷⁶ but interacting with the Athenian council and assembly. As is well known, the reality did not live up to the ideal.⁷⁷ Athens did not become rich and powerful through this league as it had done through the Delian League, but we find instances of interference in internal affairs, garrisons and governors, collection of money (under the new name of *syntaxeis*) and the establishment of Athenian cleruchies; and, although the league's council was not suppressed, when Athens negotiated with Philip of Macedon in 346 it agreed to accept whatever Athens decided,⁷⁸ and its own recommendations were not adopted.⁷⁹

The Boeotian federal state was dismantled after the Peace of Antalcidas. Thebes was occupied by Sparta in 382, and this occupation of one of the leading *poleis* of Greece by another, when they had not even been at war with each other, was one of the most shocking events in Greek history: it was followed by the rule of the pro-Spartan party in Thebes, kept in power by a Spartan garrison. In 379/8 Thebes was liberated, and in the years that followed the Boeotian federal state was revived.

There are two points which we need to notice. First, although organisation by units and the office of boeotarch were retained, the sovereign body was not now a representative council but an assembly open to all Boeotian citizens,⁸⁰ and because Thebans could attend assemblies in Thebes more easily than men from other *poleis* the assembly will have been dominated by Thebes as the old council was not. Secondly, the history of the 370's and 360's shows other Boeotian *poleis* resisting the federal state and being dealt with harshly: Plataea was destroyed in 373/2;⁸¹ Thespieae with its dependencies was first forced to *συντελεῖν εἰς τὰς Θήβας* (which perhaps means to join the federation), then possibly the *polis* of Thespieae was dismantled, and finally Thespieae was destroyed and depopulated;⁸² after Leuctra Orchomenus was first given the status of an ally, which presumably means excluded from the federal state, and later destroyed.⁸³ Where we have evidence, for 371⁸⁴ and in inscriptions which may belong to the late 360's, the boeotarchs number seven:⁸⁵ it has been suggested that the units are the same as in the old federation, with Plataea added to Thebes once more and Thespieae and Orchomenus eliminated,⁸⁶ and that would give Thebes an absolute majority of units; but there are difficulties in this view.⁸⁷ Regardless of that, it is clear that the new federal state was dominated by Thebes to a much greater extent

than the old, and that citizens of the other *poleis* in Boeotia could not now feel that they were equal partners in a Boeotian *politeia*.

This phase in Greek history is ended, and the hellenistic period is foreshadowed, by the establishment of Philip's League of Corinth after Chaeronea. Philip combined three strands which we have been following in the fourth century: a Common Peace, which guaranteed the freedom and independence of the Greek states and sought to maintain a balance of weakness among them; a hegemonic league, with the Macedonian king as *hegemon* and with a council of allies which had its own presidential apparatus; and representation in proportion to size, as in federal Boeotia.⁸⁸

The leagues of Sparta, Athens and Thebes had been attempts to extend the power of one leading *polis* over other *poleis* in ways which the other *poleis* could accept because, at any rate in theory, their integrity as independent *poleis* was not undermined and they played a part in the decision-making of the larger body. Similarly the League of Corinth was an attempt to clothe Philip's domination of Greece in garments which the *poleis* and other states of Greece could accept. Here, however, Philip's dominant position was clear from the start. The foundation oath underwrote the kingdom of Philip and his descendants, and the position of the *hegemon* in the League; in Alexander's absence in Asia οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι deputised for him as *hegemon*;⁸⁹ clauses certainly present when the League was revived by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 302 and probably present at the beginning made decisions of the council binding and forbade the member states to call their representatives to account,⁹⁰ so that representatives would be more likely to vote as the *hegemon* wished than as their own states wished. The façade was still there, but in the League of Corinth the *politai* of the member *poleis* were certainly not partners in a greater community. For the smaller *poleis*, this subordination to a Macedonian king, who lived a long way away and had many other things to worry about, might in practice be less irksome than the subordination to one of the major Greek *poleis* to which they had become accustomed; but to a major *polis* like Athens, which had aimed to dominate rather than be dominated, incorporation in Philip's league meant not only humiliation but a serious loss of freedom.

In the hellenistic period the Greek cities had to manoeuvre between the great kings. Alexander the Great had announced himself as a liberator to the Greek cities of Asia Minor,⁹¹ and from Polyperchon's proclamation in 319⁹² there were many occasions when one or other of

the kings promised to respect the freedom of the Greeks whose support he was trying to win. The pessimistic view of this is that the freedom was a total sham, that none of the kings regarded his power as limited by such promises and that all the decisions that mattered were taken by the kings. The optimistic view, which I hold and which I think is becoming the fashionable view,⁹³ is that, as long as there was a plurality of kings, manoeuvring between them was not unlike the manoeuvring of the lesser cities between the greater in the classical period, that with the established cities of the Greek world proper (unlike the cities which they retained or founded inside their own kingdoms) the kings did not interfere directly very drastically very often, and that the citizens of the Greek cities were still able to think of themselves as *politai* of independent *poleis*.

One or two phenomena, which began in the classical period but are more prominent in the hellenistic, deserve some attention. First, the arrangements between states which are given the label *isopoliteia* or *sym-politeia*. The Plataeans may have been given a form of Athenian citizenship, actually or potentially, when they became allies of Athens in 519;⁹⁴ after the destruction of their city in 427 they were given Athenian citizenship of a special kind, with limited rights in the first generation.⁹⁵ At the end of the Peloponnesian War Samos was rewarded for its loyalty to Athens with a grant of Athenian citizenship, which could be exercised by Samians living in Athens, but this grant was explicitly intended to leave Samos in existence as a separate *polis*, allied to Athens but fully independent.⁹⁶ The effect of both arrangements was that men living in a *polis* with which their own *polis* had a special relationship could exercise the rights of a citizen there, as an exception to the normal Greek principle that citizenship was limited to those who fully belonged to a *polis* and could not be acquired as of right by those who settled in a *polis*.

Something more than that was perhaps involved in the deal struck between Argos and Corinth during the Corinthian War, at the beginning of the fourth century: our texts suggest that in some sense Argos gained possession of Corinth,⁹⁷ and that this could be represented as contrary to the principle of independence for all *poleis* on which the Common Peace treaties were based, so that when the Peace of Antalcidas was made the Spartans could threaten to use force if Argos did not withdraw from Corinth.⁹⁸ The minimum interpretation is that our texts are giving a biased picture of an *isopoliteia* agreement, by which Corinthians could exercise the rights of citizens when in Argos and Argives could exercise the rights of citizens when in Corinth,⁹⁹ but it is possible that eventually if not at first the agreement amounted to more than that, and that for a few

years Argos and Corinth to some extent coalesced into a single political unit, dominated by Argos and by those Corinthians who sympathised with Argos.¹⁰⁰

The hellenistic period provides many instances of treaties establishing *isopoliteia* or *sympoliteia*.¹⁰¹ Sometimes, as in a treaty between Pergamum and Temnus,¹⁰² two states give rights to each other's citizens on a basis of equality, as happened in theory on the minimal interpretation of the treaty between Argos and Corinth. On other occasions, as in a treaty between Smyrna and Magnesia by Sipylus,¹⁰³ a greater city absorbs a lesser, so that the product is a single *polis* which perpetuates the name and identity of the greater city; *politai* of both old cities become *politai* of the new, but those who were *politai* of the greater city will inevitably have preponderant influence, as our texts suggest was the case with Argos and Corinth. Citizenship still matters, as the package of rights which goes with full membership of a *polis*, but there is less sense that the *politai* are a community of families that have belonged together for generations. A growing network of *isopoliteia* agreements meant that there was a growing chance that a man could 'have the vote' in the city in which he lived, irrespective of whether that was 'his own' city or not.

An important part is played in the history of the Greek mainland by two leagues which were not the creation of a powerful city, like the hegemonic leagues of the classical period, but were based on an *ethnos*, a particular strand of the Greek people, and then expanded to take in members from outside their own *ethnos*. The Aetolians in the fifth and fourth centuries were a people who had both tribal units and city units, and they had some kind of federal organisation.¹⁰⁴ When the League expanded beyond Aetolia proper, neighbouring peoples were designated *tele* and perhaps given a status equivalent to that of one of the three tribes,¹⁰⁵ while more distant recruits were given *isopoliteia* either with one of the cities of Aetolia or with the League as a whole.¹⁰⁶ The hellenistic League had an assembly which held two regular meetings a year and could hold extraordinary meetings; as far as we know, those who attended the assembly voted as individuals; inscriptions mention a *synedrion* or *boule*, composed of representatives of the cities,¹⁰⁷ which joined with the *strategos* in enforcing grants of *asylia*; while literary texts mention the *apokletoi*, who could take fairly important decisions without waiting for the next meeting of the assembly.

An Achaean League existed, and was already prepared to incorporate outside members,¹⁰⁸ in the classical period. The League broke up at the end of the fourth century, but was revived in 281/0 and began to acquire

members from outside Achaea in 251/0. League business was transacted at four *synodoi* a year, which comprised meetings both of a council consisting of representatives of the cities and of an assembly open to all citizens. Towards the end of the third century major questions of foreign policy were transferred from the *synodoi* to specially convened *synkletoi*, which usually involved both council and assembly but on occasion could involve the council alone.¹⁰⁹ The council and the assembly both voted by cities.¹¹⁰

The individual cities of these leagues retained local autonomy, and in the Achaean League if not in the Aetolian they had an active political life of their own. We find two cities of the Achaean League making an agreement on lawsuits as if they were totally independent *poleis*,¹¹¹ though the League was involved in the appointment of the Megarians as arbitrators to decide a boundary dispute between Epidaurus and Corinth.¹¹² In the Aetolian League citizenship grants to foreigners are grants by the League of Aetolian citizenship, not tied to any particular *polis*;¹¹³ but in the Achaean League grants are grants by individual *poleis* of their own citizenship. In League affairs, the assemblies were not rubber stamps, but serious debates took place in them and the *strategoï* of the Leagues could not count on getting the vote to go as they wished. The danger to bodies larger than a single *polis* which had an assembly (as we have seen with the Boeotian federation as revived in the 370's) was that those living in or near the place of meeting could attend in large numbers and, even if the voting was by cities, exercise undue influence. Partly for this reason Philopoemen proposed in 188 that the Achaean League should abandon the rule that *synodoi* were always to be held at Aegium – and to get his proposal accepted he arranged for it to be discussed not at a *synodos* at Aegium but at a *synkletos* held elsewhere.¹¹⁴

These leagues were more equitable than the hegemonic leagues of the classical period. The citizens of all the constituent states could feel that citizenship of their own *polis* still mattered; in the League they were eligible for the major offices, were represented in the council and could attend the assembly, and no *hegemon* dominated the League, so there they could feel that they were genuinely participating members in a greater enterprise.

The last stage came with the Roman conquest. The freedom of the Greeks was promised yet again by Flamininus in 196.¹¹⁵ When Macedonia was made a Roman province, in 146, Greece was not incorporated in that or in any other province, but it was regarded by the Romans, if not understood by all the Greeks, as being under Roman

control. The wars of the last century of the Republic gave the Greeks a few last opportunities for manoeuvring between the greater powers, until Augustus ended the wars, and in 27 created a province of Achaia.

The Romans had developed a concept of citizenship which was different from Aristotle's view of *politai* sharing in a *politeia*. Citizenship had become essentially a matter of status and juridical rights, and it seemed not to matter that an increasing proportion of the citizens lived at a great distance from Rome and could not vote or hold office in Rome. Thus Roman citizenship was something which could perfectly well be combined with being a *municeps* of one's own *municipium* or a *polites* of one's own *polis*, and a solution was provided, though not a democratic solution, to the problem of reconciling membership of a small local unit with membership of a large state.

In the Greek world the most successful solutions had been those in which membership of the smallest units was still worthwhile but the large unit was organised in such a way that all could regard themselves as participating fairly in that: the demes and the *polis* of Athens, the cities and the *koinon* of Boeotia before the Peace of Antalcidas, the member states of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues. As for our modern world, I think our best hope lies in the principle of subsidiarity which is emphasised by some people in the European Community, the principle that a matter should not be dealt with at a higher level if it can be dealt with adequately at a lower. However, I am afraid subsidiarity is not a magic word which will solve all our problems instantly, since it is not self-evident what are the units deserving to have their own level of government, and how it is to be decided whether a lower level's handling of a matter is adequate. We still need to work out for our world how people can be enabled to feel that they belong to a community of *politai* in a *politeia*.¹¹⁶

Notes

1 Arist. *Pol.* 3. 1276b1-2.

2 R.J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (U. of Alberta P., 1979), 90-1, without details.

3 Plutarch *ap. schol. Hes. Op.* 633-40 (Arist. fr. 565 Rose [Teubner]). For the archaeological record of the region of Thespieae and Ascræ see A. M. Snodgrass in *La Béotie antique* (Colloque C.N.R.S. 1983. Paris: C.N.R.S., 1985), 87-95, and in J. W. Rich & A. F. Wallace-Hadrill (edd.), *City and Country in the Ancient World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 12-14: there were very few occupied sites in the geometric period and not a large number until the classical, and there was not physically a city of Thespieae until the fifth century; Ascræ

was the main settlement of its district until the late hellenistic period, when it was deserted for about three hundred years. The first interpretation of the fragment on Ascra is that of Buck, *loc. cit.*; the second is that of Snodgrass, *La Béotie antique*, 94.

4 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3 cf. 17.3. Their physical migration was probably a short-lived phenomenon when they were afraid of an invasion from Athens.

5 *Hell. Oxy.* 16.3.

6 Str. 8.3.2 (337). Argument about the date does not matter here. S. & H. Hodkinson, *BSA* 86 (1981) 239-96, esp. 279-91, suggest that the making and breaking of the synoecism did not have drastic effects on the pattern of settlement in the district.

7 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7, Diod. Sic. 15.5.4.

8 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-5.

9 W.G. Cavanagh in Rich & Wallace-Hadrill (n. 3, above), 107-9, notes that the archaeological record points to expansion from Athens towards the end of the dark age rather than centralisation on Athens of communities previously independent of it.

10 Its importance was first stressed by J. W. Headlam, *Election by Lot at Athens* (Cambridge U. P., 1891) 167-8.

11 This may remain true whenever we date the incorporation of Eleusis into Attica. A. Andrewes in *C.A.H.*² III. ii (1982) 362-3, favoured a date c. 900 for the completion of the unification of Attica.

12 Plut. *Sol.* 8-10, 12. 5, with A. French, *JHS* 77 (1957) 241, R.J. Hopper, *BSA* 56 (1961) 208-17, L. Piccirilli, *ASNP*³ 8 (1978) 1-13. D. J. R. Williams, *AK* 23 (1980) 137-45, revives the view of K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² I. ii. 312-3, that the Spartan arbitrator Cleomenes (Plut. *Sol.* 10.6) was the king and that the final award belongs to the late sixth century.

13 Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 54.8, and the demotics in *IG II*² 1225-8.

14 E.g. A.W. Pickard-Cambridge rev. J.P.A. Gould & D.M. Lewis, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford U. P. 1968) 57-8. In this case an argument for the end of the sixth century is presented by W. R. Connor *C&M* 40 (1989) 7-32 = *Aspects of Athenian Democracy* (*C&M Dissertationes* xi [1990] 7-32).

15 Cf. *IG I*² 943 (Meiggs & Lewis 48) 96-7.

16 Cf. Arist. fr. 532 Rose (Teubner), Paus. 3.2.6; but on Pharis and Geronthrae, according to Pausanias abandoned by their original inhabitants and resettled by the Spartans, see P. A. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (Routledge, 1979), 106-8.

17 Great *Rhetra ap.* Plut. *Lyc.* 6.2.

18 E.g. H. T. Wade-Gery, *CQ* 38 (1944) 117 = *Essays in Greek History* (Blackwell, 1958), 70-1; Cartledge, *op. cit.* 107-8.

19 In the hellenistic period obes had their own officials and could pass decrees to honour them (e.g. *IG V.i.26* [Michel 182, *SIG*³ 932] – but by then the links between the obes and the villages on which they were originally based had been weakened (N.F. Jones, *Public Organization in Ancient Greece* [Mem. Amer. Philos. Soc. 176 (1987)] 121-3).

20 Cf. Cartledge, *op. cit.* 97-100, 178-85.

21 E.g. Her. 7.234.2, Thuc. 5.54.1, Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.21.

22 E.g. Thuc. 5.68; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15.

23 E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19.

24 On the helots see Cartledge, *op. cit.* 96-7, 160-77.

25 Arist. *Pol.* 7.1326a5-27a10.

26 M. H. Hansen, *SO* 56 (1981) 19-32, P. J. Rhodes, *Thucydides: History II* (Aris & Phillips, 1988), 271-6, for the fifth century, suggesting a higher figure than has commonly

been accepted; M. H. Hansen, *Demography and Democracy* (Herning: Systime, 1986), for the fourth century, championing the 31,000 of Diod. Sic. 18.18.5 against the 21,000 of Plut. *Phoc.* 28.7.

27 9,000 *kleroi*, Plut. *Lyc.* 8; 8,000 in 480, Her. 7.234.2.

28 Her. 1.65-8.

29 Her. 9.26.

30 Her. 1.149-51.

31 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sb. Berlin* 1906, 38-57, J. M. Cook, *C.A.H.*² III. i. 749-50, iii. 217, against H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge U. P., 1952), 2-6 with 62-5 nn. 5-19.

32 Her. 1.141.4; 6.7 cf. 5.109.3.

33 Her. 1.171.3.

34 Her. 6.11-2.

35 But I doubt the secrecy alleged in Her. 5.74.1.

36 G. E. M. De Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Duckworth, 1972), 105-23 with 339-40.

37 P. A. Brunt, *Hist.* 2 (1953-4) 135-63, esp. 141-6, against B. D. Meritt *et al.*, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, iii (Princeton: A.S.C.S.A., 1950: hereafter *A.T.L.* iii), 95-105 cf. 183-4. The case for regarding the alliance as an extension of the Peloponnesian League has been restated by A. Tronson, *Act. Class.* 34 (1991) 93-110.

38 Cf. Her. 7.148.4-149, 158.5-162, 8.2.2-3.

39 Her. 7.172, 175-7.

40 Her. 8.19; 49, 56-64, 1.74-82; 108.

41 Thuc. 1.102.1, 4.

42 *Ath. Pol.* 23.5.

43 Thuc. 3.11.4.

44 I accept the view of J. A. O. Larsen, *HSCP* 51 (1940) 175-213, P. Culham, *AJAH* 3 (1978) 27-31, that there was a single council in which Athens had one vote like every other member, against that of N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* 87 (1967) 41-61 = *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford U. P., 1973), 311-45, that Athens was counterbalanced by a council of allies in which Athens was not represented.

45 Especially Thuc. 1.97.1, 3.10.4-11.3

46 R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford U. P., 1972), 46, against *A.T.L.* iii. 228.

47 M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982), P. Karavites, *RIDA*³ 29 (1982) 145-62.

48 Thuc. 3.10.5.

49 I do not believe there was a formal distinction between autonomous allies and subject allies: see P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (*G&R New Surveys* 17 [1985]), 27, against J. B. Bury, *History of Greece* (Macmillan, 1900), 338-9 = J. B. Bury & R. Meiggs, *History of Greece* (4th ed. Macmillan, 1975), 210.

50 E.g. Thuc. 1.98.4; 3.10.4.

51 Thuc. 2.63.3 (Pericles), 3.37.2 (Cleon), Arist. *Eq.* 1111-4; cf. Thuc. 1.122.3 (Corinth).

52 Thuc. 1.139.3, 2.8.4.

53 Her. 6.108.2-5.

54 Paus. 10.20.3, Her. 9.15.1.

55 Thuc. 5.38.2, *Hell. Oxy.* 16.

56 Perhaps before 427, when Thebes added two units for Plataea and its dependencies to

its original two, there were nine units in all. Other problems concerning the units are explored by C. J. Dull in *Proceedings of the IIIrd International Conference on Boiotian Antiquities*, 1979 (McGill Univ. Mon. in Class. Arch. & Hist. 2. Amsterdam: Gieben, 1985), 33-9.

57 The existence of Eleusis as a state partly separate from Athens between 403 and 401/0 was not due to a desire for secession among the demesmen but was the result of the occupation of Eleusis by Athenian oligarchs (belonging to various demes) who were unwilling to live in a democratic Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.8-10, 23-4, 43; *Ath. Pol.* 39, 40.4).

58 This theme was stressed by J.A.O. Larsen, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Sather Lectures 28; U. of California P. 1955).

59 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21-2.

60 E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14 (392).

61 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15 (392), contr. And. 3. *De Pace* 12 (392/1), Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31 (387/6).

62 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15 (392), 5.1.32-3 (387/6), contr. And. 3 *De Pace* 13 (392/1).

63 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-7, Diod. Sic. 15.5.3-5, 12.

64 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33-4.

65 E.g. Diod. Sic. 15.89.1-2 (362/1).

66 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31. E. Badian in *Georgica ... G.L. Cawkwell (BICS Supp. 58 [1991], 25-48* at 37-40, stresses that the peace is technically between two parties of belligerents; but autonomy is stipulated for 'the other Greek cities', and he suggests that Sparta tried to extend the peace as far as she could. The peace was to be 'common' in its application, if not in the list of those who swore to it.

67 Technically, it is argued by T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford U.P. for U. of Hull, 1965), 40 with n. 1, Persia was committed to action only if a state rejected the terms at the beginning; but Badian *op. cit.* 41-2, argues that on this point Xenophon's translation may be at fault, and in any case Sparta could still threaten to invoke Persia. Badian assumes that the treaty to which the Greeks swore must have included clauses on enforcement, although none are attested.

68 Cf. Ryder, *op. cit.* 68, 72.

69 Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18, reading εὐορκον ... τοῖς ἀδικούσιν (a suggestion which I first encountered in 1963 in the Oxford lectures of D.M. Lewis).

70 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2.

71 M. Sordi, *RFIC* 79 = ²29 (1951) 53-5, Cf. Ryder, *op. cit.* 71-2, 132-3.

72 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36.

73 Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10.

74 Diod. Sic. 15.89.1-2.

75 *IG* II² 43.19-31, cf. II² 34 and 44 (Michel 86, 1446, 87; *SIG*³ 147, 142, 148; Tod 123, 118, 124.

76 Inscription *ap. S. Accame, La lega ateniese del sec. IV a.C.* (Rome: Signorelli, 1941) 230, 14-6.

77 Despite the case made out by J.L. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (U. of California P., 1981).

78 Aesch. 2.60.

79 Aesch. 2.60-2, 3.69-72.

80 Cf. *IG* VII 2407 (= *SIG*³ 179), 2408, *SEG* XXXIV 355.

81 Diod. Sic. 15.46.4-6; Paus. 9.1.8 (with the correct date).

82 C.J. Tuplin, *Athen.*² 64 (1986) 321-4.

83 Diod. Sic. 15.57.1 with J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371-62 B.C.* (Harvard U.P., 1980), 66 and 291 n. 33; 15.79.3-6. That after Leuctra the allies of Thebes/Boeotia were

organised in a league with a council is wrongly denied by Buckler, *op. cit.* 222-3. The case is restated by D.M. Lewis in *Essays in the Topography, History and Culture of Boiotia* (*Teiresias* Supp. iii 1990) 91-3.

84 Diod. Sic. 15.52.1, 53.3, Paus. 9.13.6-7.

85 Cf. texts cited in nn. 80, 84 above.

86 G. Busolt & H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich: Beck, 1920-6) II 1429, P. Roesch, *Thespies et la confédération béotienne* (Paris: Boccard, 1965), 144-6, Buckler *op. cit.* 23.

87 C.J. Tuplin, *Athen.*² 64 (1986) 335-7. In particular, Orchomenus should have been a member in 371, when seven units are attested.

88 *IG II*² 236 (Tod 177), [Dem.] 17 *Foed. Alex.* For the *proedroi* see *IG IV*² 68 (*Staatsverträge* 446) l.c. 21-8, of 302.

89 [Dem.] 17.15 with [N.G.L. Hammond &] G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia II* (Oxford U.P., 1979), 639-46.

90 *IG IV*² 68 (*Staatsverträge* 446), l.c. 18-9, 20-1, with [Hammond &] Griffith, *op. cit.* 635-6.

91 Diod. Sic. 17.24.1, Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2.

92 Diod. Sic. 18.55.

93 Cf., e.g., P. Gauthier, *Πρακτικά 8th Int. Congr. Gr. & Lat. Epigr.*, 1982, I (Athens, 1984), 82-107.

94 Plataean speech *ap.* Thuc. 3.55.3, which not all scholars accept: see the commentaries of Gomme and Hornblower *ad loc.* We have seen above that some small neighbouring communities were in a state of *sympoliteia* with Plataea.

95 [Dem.] 59.104-6.

96 *IG II*² 1 (Michel 80, *SIG*³ 116 + 117, Meiggs & Lewis 94 + Tod 97).

97 And. 3. *De Pace* 26-7, Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6, etc., Diod. Sic. 14.92.1.

98 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34, 36.

99 E.g. J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford U. P., 1984) 357-62.

100 E.g. G. T. Griffith, *Hist.* 1 (1950) 245-52.

101 Modern scholars distinguish between *isopoliteia* agreed between two states which are to remain independent, by which citizens of each may exercise the rights of citizens in the other when they are there, and *sympoliteia*, by which two or more states are merged in one; but the terms are not always used in those senses in ancient texts.

102 *I. Pergamon* 5 (Michel 18, *OGIS* 265, *Staatsverträge* 555).

103 *Staatsverträge* 492 (Michel 19, *OGIS* 229). In this instance Smyrna is absorbing a smaller neighbouring state, as a greater state might have done in the classical period, and is at the same time acting as an agent of the Seleucid kingdom, to secure its whole neighbourhood for the Seleucids against the Ptolemies.

104 In Tod 137 Athens complains to the *koinon* about the conduct of one of the cities.

105 E.g. the Locrians, *SGDI* 2070.

106 E.g. *SIG*³ 522.3, *IG IX*² i.136.

107 *IG IX*².i 188 (Michel 22, *SIG*³ 546 B): Melitaea and Perea, in Phthiotic Achaëa, are currently united as a single *polis*, but League *dikastai* define the boundaries between the two, and Perea is given the right to withdraw from the union and in that case to send one member to the council.

108 Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1. On Achaëa in the archaic and classical periods see C. Morgan, *PSPS*² 37 (1991) 131-63, esp. 146-8.

109 Council alone, Polyb. 28.3.10; all men over thirty, Polyb. 29.24.6.

110 On the much-discussed problems of the Achaean council and assembly I follow the

most recent view of F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, iii (Oxford U. P., 1979) 406-14.

111 *IG* V ii 357 (*Staatsverträge* 567).

112 *IG* IV 926 (Michel 40, *SIG*³ 471).

113 *IG* IX² i 7,9,10.

114 Livy, 38.30.2-5, on which I follow E. Badian & R. M. Errington, *Hist.* 14 (1965) 13-17, Errington, *Philopoemen* (Oxford U. P., 1969) 137-40.

115 Polyb. 18.44.1-3, 46.1-9.

116 I thank members of the University of St. Andrews Classics Research Seminar for listening to a first version of this paper and discussing it with me; and my respondent E. Badian and all who discussed the paper with me in Copenhagen.